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The notion that the poor countries of the world can in any reasonable
interval achieve rich-country incomes without trade and capital flows
is utterly implausible. If the poor countries of the world have to depend
on themselves for the saving to finance the investment that they need, or
have to develop themselves the skills and technology they need to become
rich by our standards, its going to take forever.—Nobel Laureate Robert
Solow
George Seurat created sweeping ‘Pointillist’ landscapes by painting
millions of tiny dots. But that effort is nothing compared with the
painstaking detail involved in creating a landscape of economic, political
and social reform.—King Abdullah II of Jordan, April 2004
ABSTRACT Over the last several decades, the economic performance of the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) has lagged behind many other parts of the world. While a number
of factors have been cited as the cause of the region’s malaise, the lack of globalization is
increasingly mentioned as a possible source of difficulty. Focusing on the factors
responsible for increased levels of globalization, it appears that internal policy reforms
rather than external constraints are primarily responsible for the relative integration of the
MENA countries into the world economy. Of the areas of policy under the direct control
of MENA governments, improvements in several categories of governance, rather than
further economic reforms, appear most effective in the attainment of increased levels of
globalization.
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Introduction
The gap between the per capita income of most Middle East and North
African (MENA) countries and that of advanced industrial countries has
widened since the early 1990s. The economic growth performance of the
MENA countries has also been weak by developing country standards. Yet
the diversity of growth patterns within this group defies easy generalizations
on the reasons underlying the disappointing performance (Nunnenkamp,
2004).
One increasingly held view is that many of the economic and social problems
confronting most Middle Eastern countries stem from their failure to become
more integrated into the global economy. The benefits of globalization are
widely documented. As noted in a recent World Bank (2002) report:
Globalization generally reduced poverty because more integrated
economies tend to grow faster and this growth is usually widely
diffused. As low income countries break into global markets for
manufactures and services, poor people can move from the vulnerability
of grinding rural poverty to better jobs, often in towns or cities. In
addition to the structural relocation, integration raises productivity job
by job.
Unfortunately, the term ‘globalization’ is ill defined and as a result means
many different things to different people. In the advanced industrial countries,
it is often largely viewed in economic terms—the free movement of goods,
services, labor and capital across boarders. Although it does not constitute
a new phenomenon, it is often seen as the inexorable integration of markets,
nations and technologies to a degree never witnessed before in a way that is
enabling individuals, and corporations, to reach around the world further,
faster, deeper and more economically than ever before.
In the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region, however, globalization
has often been discussed in largely ideological terms. It has been promoted by
a few, such as King Abdullah of Jordan, but more often attached as a new
version of imperialism. Critics have pointed to a number of related dangers, all
of which they see as part of a real of potential threat to their political, economic
and cultural independence. One thing is fairly certain, regardless of how one
measures it, the MENA region remains one of the most unglobalized regions
in the world.
After examining recent patterns of economic integration and addressing the
operational issues involved in measuring globalization, the sections below
examine the factors underlying the weak integration of the MENA countries
into the global economy. Have these been largely in the form of external
constraints dictated by forces outside the control of the region as a whole?
Or, in contrast, have internal constraints on the nature and speed of reforms
in individual countries been responsible? Specifically, have economic reforms
been insufficient to take advantage of the opportunities opened up by increased
world-wide integration? Or, has the lag in governance and institutional
development been primarily responsible?
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MENA in the World Economy
There is no question the MENA countries as a whole are poorly integrated
into the world economy. The region receives only one third the foreign
direct investment (FDI) expected for its economic size (and most
is concentrated in enclave sectors of a handful of countries, while portfolio
investment is virtually nonexistent because equity markets are under-
developed. As a recent International Monetary Fund study observed
(Abed, 2003):
1. Global financial integration lags behind that in other regions; less than
half of MENA countries have meaningful access to financial markets.
Trade performance is below that of other regions: while oil exports
continue to be a substantial source of foreign exchange earnings for oil
producers, the relative importance (until the recent price increases) of
such exports declined since 1985. The growth of non-oil exports varied
during this period but on the whole, was slower than for developing
countries as a group.
2. As a result the MENA region’s share of the world export market fell by
more than half between 1980 and 2000 (the results are the same
including or excluding oil exports), whereas the developing countries’
share rose slightly during this same period. The region’s information
and technology links are among the weakest in the world—the number
of internet user per capita, for example, is low compared with other
regions.
The Middle East region as a whole did as well or better than Latin America
and even Asia in the first postwar decades, but has declined steadily for the last
thirty years despite the dramatic rise in the price of oil—as its failure to
integrate with the world economy has become glaringly obvious (Noland and
Pack, 2004). Over the past 20–25 years, most of the region has essentially
‘de-globalized’ at a time when its population was doubling. A variety of
indicators point to this de-globalization (Bergsten, 2004):
. The Middle East share of world trade has dropped by 75% in the last
25 years;
. Half of the Arab League’s 22 members have not even joined the World
Trade Organization (WTO);
. The 22 nations of the Arab League, with a population of 260 million,
receive half as much FDI as Sweden, with a population of 9 million;
. The ratio of FDI to gross domestic product (GDP) in the Middle East
countries is at least three to four times lower than found in other
developing economies;
. Tariff rates in the region remain very high—ranging from more than 40%
in Pakistan to 20% or higher in nations such as Egypt, Syria or Saudi
Arabia;
. While regional economic integration has become a top priority through-
out Asia, Latin American and even Africa, conflicts, boycotts and
sanctions limit the possibility in the Middle East;
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. Foreign equity investment in the entire region roughly equals that of
Indonesia, suggesting a very undeveloped capital market and poor
allocation of the very limited savings pool it has to draw upon;
. The Middle East countries together spend about half as much per year
tapping international technology as does Brazil.
Several studies have attempted to capture and summarize these patterns in
some sort of aggregate summary index. For example, the World Bank (1996)
has developed a ‘Speed of Integration Index’ (table 1). The Index was derived
from changes between the early 1980s and early 1990s in four main indicators:
(1) the ratio of real trade to GDP, (2) the ratio of FDI to GDP, (3) Institutional
Investor credit ratings, and the share of manufactures. The speed of integration
index is the simple average of changes in the four indicators over the period
expressed as standardized scores.
The index confirms the fact that MENA countries have been slow to integrate
into the world economy. Compared with other regions, MENA has a high
proportion of ‘weak’ and ‘slow’ integrators. Nearly 67% of the countries in East
Asia are considered ‘fast’ integrators as are 23% of those in Latin America and
the Caribbean. In contrast, only 15% of MENA countries can be classified as
such. Significantly, the percentage (38.4%) of MENA countries that are ‘slow
integrators’, is only marginally lower than similar ones in sub-Saharan Africa
(39%), but significantly higher than those in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Taking a slightly different approach, a recent composite index (Looney and
Frederiksen, 2004) of world-wide movements in globalization found the
Middle Eastern countries falling further behind other parts of the world in their
degree of integration into the world economy. South Asia along with the
Middle East has experienced a distinct downward trend over this period
(figure 1). That is even though these countries may have introduced
liberalization programs, deregulation of key sectors, and more open trade
regimes, becoming more globalized in an absolute sense, they fell behind the
advanced countries and East Asian countries in a relative sense.
Approaches in Defining Globalization
As the previous section suggests, there are many ways in which the MENA
region interacts with the rest of the world. Are some indicators more significant
indicators than others? Clearly, when examining globalization patterns and
issues, one of the first issues is to define exactly what one is talking about
(Dunn, 2001). As noted above, there are a myriad of ways of viewing and
measuring globalization. However, three approaches stand out.
First, globalization can be seen as the growing liberalization of international
trade and investment that results in increases in the integration of national
economies (Griswold, 2000). Henderson (1999) has expanded this definition
to define globalization as consisting of five related but distinct parts:
. The increasing tendency for firms to think, plan, operate and invest for









































































Table 1. Speed of integration of developing countries, early 1980s to early 1990s
Speed









No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Fast Integrators 6 66.7 3 60.0 5 23.8 2 15.4 2 5.5 5 55.6
Moderate Integrators 2 40.0 5 23.8 4 30.8 10 27.8 2 22.2
Weak Integrators 3 33.3 9 42.9 2 15.4 10 27.8
Slow Integrators 2 9.5 5 38.4 14 38.9 2 22.2
Total 9 100.0 5 100.0 21 100.0 13 100.0 36 100.0 9 100.0
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. The growing ease and cheapness of international communications,
with the Internet as the leading aspect.
. The trend towards closer international economic integration, resulting in
the diminished importance of political boundaries. This trend is fueled
partly by the first two trends, but even more powerfully by official policies
aimed at trade and investment liberalization.
. The apparently growing significance of issues and problems extending
beyond national boundaries and the resulting impetus to deal with tem
through some form of internationally concerted action.
. The tendency towards uniformity (or harmonization by which norms,
standards, rules and practices are defined and enforced with respect to
regions or the world as a whole rather than within the bounds of national
states.
A second way of viewing globalization is from the manner in which it is
perceived by different governments/groups. Here, views about globalization
can be categorized into four main perspectives: (1) economic, (2) technological,
(3) development, and (4) societal (Mujahid, 2002).
The Economic Perspective of globalization focuses on the growth of world
trade as a proportion of output (the ratio of world imports to gross world
product has grown from some 7% in 1938 to about 10% in 1970 to over 20%
in 2000). It is reflected in the explosion of FDI: FDI in developing countries
has increased from US$2.2 billion in 1970 to nearly US$200 billion in 2000.
It has resulted also in national capital markets becoming increasingly integrated,
to the point where some US$1.3 trillion per day crosses the foreign exchange































Figure 1. Patterns of globalization, 1988–1996 (Source: Looney and Frederiksen, 2004).
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markets of the world, of which less than 2% is directly attributable to trade
transactions.
The Technological Perspective of globalization stresses the importance of
new technologies in the communication and transport sectors. As a result of
these technological advances the costs of transport, of travel, and above all the
costs of communicating information have fallen dramatically in the postwar
period. For example, a 3-minute telephone call from the USA to Britain cost
US$12 in 1946, whereas today it can cost as little as 48 cents, despite the fact
that consumer prices have multiplied by over eight times in the intervening
period. As a result of new technologies and lower costs, multinationals have
been able to switch operations to cheaper developing countries. Companies like
Dell have been outsourcing in India for tasks such as customer service. To
a much lesser extent a MENA country, Pakistan, has also been a beneficiary
of this sort of out-sourcing. Another dimension to this phenomena is the brain
drain of highly skilled workers from India and Pakistan to the USA and
Europe. Remittances from these workers are becoming a major source of
foreign exchange for these countries.
The Development Perspective of globalization is the most controversial.
Has globalization done one or all of the following: (a) lessened or increased the
gap between the rich countries and the poorer? (b) caused increased poverty
and income disparity in countries more exposed to world market forces?
and (c) expanded the gap between the technological haves and have-nots?
Unfortunately, economic theory provides no definitive answer with neo-
classical advocates1 stressing the convergence of incomes, while exogenous
growth theorists acknowledging that divergence might be underway (Romer,
1986; Lucas 1988). A related debate takes off from the old spread and
backwash models of development (Landes, 1998).
The Societal Perspective of globalization focuses on some key factors that
the globalization process is associated with or is said to impact. These include
the condition of human rights, women empowerment, gender sensitization,
civic education, status of women in the society, political status becoming more
democratic, freedom of speech, rule of law, equal access to resources and level
of education.
A third and final way of examining globalization is to view it has
a historical process. This approach is best summarized by Nobel Prize
winner Amartya Sen (2001) of Cambridge University:
1. Globalization is not new, nor is it just Westernization: Over thousands of
years, globalization has progressed through travel, trade, migration,
spread of cultural influences and dissemination of knowledge and
understanding (including since and technology).
2. Globalization is not in itself a folly: It has enriched the world scientifically
and culturally and benefited many people economically as well. In this
regard modern technologies as well as economic interrelations have been
influential.
3. The use of the market economy can produce different outcomes.
Specifically, the market economy can generate many different results,
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depending on how physical resources are distributed, how human
resources are developed, what rules prevail and so on in all these spheres
and the state and the society have roles, within a country and in the
world.
4. The world has changed since the Bretton Woods Agreement: The current
economic, financial, and political architecture of the world (including the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other institutions)
was largely set up in the 1940s, following the Bretton Woods Conference
in 1944. The implication being that the current system does not have
institutions that are responsive to many of the changed economic
circumstances and as such many parts of the world are not well served
by the current system.
Sen is suggesting that various parts of the world have evolved somewhat
differently over the last several decades and, as a result, possess economic
environments that have different potentials for: (1) growth, (2) technological
absorption, and (3) responding to external shocks. Of the approaches to
globalization noted above, this one appears to be the most useful for the
purposes at hand. To be useful, however, one must first derive an operational,
quantifiable classification of these environments, and then show how they have
varied over time.
Approaches at Measuring Globalization
The different approaches to examining globalization while providing valuable
insights to the phenomena also illustrate the problems confronting researchers
in the area. Globalization is a complex, multi-dimensional, historical process
that does not lend itself easily characterization or measurement. In fact, despite
the volumes written on globalization, relatively little progress has been devoted
to coming up with a generally accepted measure of the concept. Has
globalization progressed more in Turkey than Egypt and if so by how much
and in what respect? Or as noted by the A.T. Kearny Corporation (2002):
For instance, how do we determine the extent to which a country has
become embedded within the global economy? How do we demonstrate
that globalization is racing ahead, rather than just limping along?
Clearly, the lack of a clear, precise definition underlies much of the
current arguments and debates overmuch the extent of globalization and
the manner that phenomenon is changing the structure of national
economies. Without the means to quantify the extent of globalization,
any meaningful evolution of its effects will remain elusive.
The few attempts made at quantifying globalization are often little more than
rankings of countries according to various criteria, such as the share of trade
in GDP, or the percentage of investment accounted for by FDI. Such
comparisons may be informative, but they suffer from arbitrariness in the
selection of data. More fundamentally, since countries usually rank differently
180 R. Looney
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depending on the data series selected, how should these series be combined to
form an unambiguous summary metric of globalization?
An attempt to overcome these problems has been made in the annual
A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Magazine (KFP) Globalization Index.2 This
aggregate index includes over 60 countries and is derived from measures of
four main dimensions of globalization: (1) technology (number of internet
users, internet hosts, and secure severs), (2) political engagement (number of
memberships in international organization, UN security council missions in
which each country participates and foreign embassies that each country
hosts), (3) personal contact (international travel and tourism, international
telephone traffic, and cross-border transferees) and (4) economic integration
(trade, FDIs and portfolio capital flows and income payments and receipts).
The four dimensions are then aggregated into an overall summary measure
of globalization (Andersen and Herbertsson, 2003).
While the KFP index represents a breakthrough in conceptualizing the
globalization process, it is not without its critics. As with any index of this sort,
it contains a certain element of arbitrariness:3 (1) Are the measures included in
the index better than any other conceivable set? (2) Is the weighting system
more meaningful than other possibilities? (3) Should efforts be made to correct
for the size of countries?—if Yemen does not host as many foreign embassies
as the USA is it somehow less globalized?—the KFP index would say yes.
As expected, the KFP globalization index (table 2) shows the Middle Eastern
countries clustered towards the bottom. Out of the 62 countries covered,
the region’s most globalized country in 2002 was Israel (22). Tunisia (35) is
the only other Middle Eastern country in the top 40.
Several features of the index are also of interest. First, there seems to be great
year-to-year variation. Morocco’s ranking fell 18 notches between 2002 and
2001 while Egypt’s fell by 12. Ruling out some sort of calamity (natural or
financial), this is not something one would expect in the real world. Second,
country rankings vary considerably across the different dimensions of
globalization. The USA ranks first on the technological dimension, but 56th
on the economic dimension. Third, some of the rankings seem counter-
intuitive. One would not expect the USA (at 56th on the economic dimension)
to be less globalized than Pakistan (at 55th). Is Tunisia at 35th really more
globalized than Taiwan at 36th? Common sense says no.
Several of these anomalies can be eliminated by smoothing over the KFP
Index through the use of Factor Analysis.4 Clearly the four KFP dimensions of
globalization are not independent of each other, and a factor analysis of them
can test to determine the extent to which they are correlated to another
(unmeasured) dimension that we might dub ‘General Globalization’. In turn
each country can be ranked in terms of its attainment on this ‘General
Globalization’ dimension.
The results of this smoothing exercise (table 3) suggest a possible alternative
to the KFP Policy index. The KFP summary index (0.815), the technical
dimension of globalization (0.924) as well as the personal (0.660) and economic
dimension (0.586) are all fairly highly correlated with this General
Globalization measure. Only the political dimension seems to stand alone
Middle East Globalization 181
*** [5.11.2005–7:55pm] [173–202] [Page No. 182] {TandF}Rmee/RMEE_A_140687.3d
First Proof Review of Middle East Economics and Finance (RMEE)
and represent a somewhat independent aspect of globalization. Using this new
General Globalization scale, the ranking of countries changes somewhat. The
USA is now ranked 2nd rather than 7th, while Taiwan is ranked 6th rather
than 36th. These changes seem more realistic than the original KFP rankings.
On the other hand, the picture for many other countries is more or less the
same—Morocco is now 46th rather than 47th, Egypt is 54th rather than 60th
and so on. More importantly, the new rankings illustrate the fundamental
problem of globalization indexes. Ultimately, all are arbitrary.
Despite these limitations the KFP index incorporates measures of
performance stemming from forces a growing consensus of observers feel
have contributed to the expansion of globalization in recent decades
(Intriligator, 2003):
. Technological innovation has significantly lowered the costs of transporta-
tion and communication, while driving down the costs of data processing
and storage.
. Trade liberalization and other factors of economic liberalization have
contributed greatly to the interchange between nations. These processes
started in the 19th century, but the two world wars and the Great
Depression interrupted them. The processes resumed after World War II,
embodied in the 1946 General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, which has
since evolved into the World Trade Organization. Barriers to trade in
goods and services are down sharply while movements of capital, labor
and technology face fewer obstacles.





from 2003 Economic Personal Technological Political
1 Ireland 0 1 2 14 11
2 Singapore 2 2 3 10 40
3 Switzerland 1 9 1 7 33
4 Netherlands 1 3 11 8 14
5 Finland 5 7 15 4 12
6 Canada 1 18 5 3 20
7 United States 4 56 35 1 28
8 New Zealand 8 35 10 2 3
9 Austria 1 13 6 13 1
10 Denmark 4 12 8 6 10
22 Israel 3 31 7 19 44
35 Tunisia 4 25 31 46 42
41 Saudi Arabia 0 49 24 43 59
46 Pakistan 6 55 36 59 34
47 Morocco 18 54 30 54 55
55 Turkey 8 53 49 38 52
60 Egypt 12 58 47 53 49
62 Iran 0 59 62 48 61
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. Changes in institutions and organizations, brought about by advances
in transportation and communications. Firms that once focused on
regional markets now produce in many countries and sell to the whole
world. Indeed almost a third of international trade now occurs within
multinational enterprises.
Table 3. Factor analysis of the Kearney globalization data set
Variables









Technical dimension 0.924 0.223 0.152 –
Internet users 0.912 0.196 0.104 –
Secure servers 0.912 0.255 0.138 –
Internet hosts 0.911 0.263 0.102 –
Telephone 0.886 0.200 0.181 0.236
Summary ranking 0.815 0.301 0.322 0.281
Travel 0.755 0.145 0.290 0.367
Portfolio 0.696 0.275 0.305
Personal dimension 0.660 0.149 0.204 0.651
Investment Income 0.599 0.206 0.536
Political dimension 0.329 0.845 0.334 0.134
International organizations 0.305 0.723 – 0.160
UN peacekeaping 0.421 0.710
Treaties 0.117 0.445 0.750
Economic dimension 0.586 – 0.731 0.255
FDI 0.493 – 0.681
Trade 0.363 0.431 0.497 0.476
REMIT04 0.217 0.164 – 0.888








Singapore 1 2 2.09425
United States 2 7 1.75985
Switzerland 3 3 1.63928
Netherlands 4 4 1.62819
Canada 5 6 1.62324
Taiwan 6 36 1.50591
Finland 7 5 1.44038
Australia 8 13 1.25204
Israel 9 22 1.15699
New Zealand 10 8 1.18089
Saudi Arabia 32 41 0.01309
Turkey 33 55 0.07891
Tunisia 41 35 0.56558
Morocco 46 47 0.70648
Iran 48 62 0.75165
Egypt 54 60 1.06942
Pakistan 57 46 1.43823
Source: Compiled by author.
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. A growing consensus on the value of free markets has had a profound effect
on economic policies. This process began with the post-Mao reforms in
China followed by the collapse of the Soviet system. The division between
market economies in the West and command economies in the East has
been replaced by a near universal reliance on markets.
These factors suggest that indigenous as well as exogenous factors have been
responsible for the limited nature of economic globalization in the MENA
region. While a number of recent studies have examined the outside factors
prompting international investors to be leery of these states, the internal
barriers to globalization have remained largely unexplored (Kamrava, 2004).
These are explored below within the framework of the region’s reform efforts.
Internal Barriers to Globalization
For the most part previous studies linking indigenous impediments to
globalization in the MENA region have tended to link region’s comparatively
low levels of global economic integration to any combination of:5 (1) insuffi-
ciently developed local markets, (2) an underdeveloped or non-existent local
labor force (as in the small monarchies of the Persian Gulf), (3) inadequate
and inaccessible information technologies, and (4) defensive reactions by local
leaders to the perceived sociocultural and political threats of globalization
(Kamrava, 2004).
The relative progress made in the various areas of reform provides a useful
framework for integrating these factors into a coherent indigenous oriented
approach to understanding the globalization process in the MENA region.
These fall into two broad categories: (a) those intended to develop efficient
market-based economies, with increased economic freedom, and (b) those
related to democracy and improved governance.
Economic Freedom
Both the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal’s Index of Economic
Freedom6 and the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World7 provide
good measures of the relative progress made by countries in moving to a
deregulated, limited government, free-market environment. Because the
Heritage Foundation data set included more of the MENA countries8 it was
used for the analysis that follows. The Heritage Index reflects the absence of
government constraint or coercion on the production, distribution or
consumption of goods and services. Stripped to its essentials, economic
freedom is concerned with property rights and choice. To measure economic
freedom the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal Index takes ten different
factors into account:
1. Trade policy;
2. Fiscal burden of government;
3. Government intervention in the economy;
4. Monetary policy;
184 R. Looney
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5. Banking and finance;
6. Capital flows and foreign investment;




Implied in these measures is the notion that economic freedom also requires
governments to refrain frommany activities. Theymust refrain from actions that
interfere with personal choice, voluntary exchange, and the freedom to enter and
compete in labor and product markets. Economic freedom is reduced when
taxes, government expenditures, and regulations are substituted for personal
choice, voluntary exchange and market coordination. Restrictions that limit
entry into occupations and business activities also retard economic freedom.
The index provides a framework for understanding most of the objectives
of US reform efforts in the region: how open countries are to competition;
the degree of state intervention in the economy, whether through taxation,
spending or overregulation, and the strength and independence of a country’s
judiciary to enforce rules and protect private property. Some countries may
have freedom in all factors; others may have freedom in just a few. One of the
most important findings of research carried out using the index is that
economic freedom is required in all aspects of economic life. That is countries
must score well in all ten of the factors in order to improve their economic
efficiency and consequently the living standards of their people (Eiras, 2003).
Governance
The other main area of US reform efforts, democracy and governance are
increasingly seen as essential for long run economic growth and prosperity. In
fact some dimensions of governance now sit at the center of academic and
policy discussions of economic development (Kitschelt, 2004).
While the ranking of countries on the basis of their relative progress in
attaining improved governance is inherently subjective, a recent World Bank
study (Kaufman et al., 2003) provides a set of rankings incorporating the full
extent of our knowledge about this phenomenon. More precisely, the World
Bank data set presents a set of estimates of six dimensions of governance
covering 199 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002.
Voice and accountability. This variable measures various aspects of the
political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators measure
the extent to which the citizens of a country are able to participate in the
selection of governments. Also included in this variable are indicators
measuring the independence of the media.
Political stability and absence of violence. This governance cluster combines
several indicators that measure perceptions of the likelihood that the
government in power will be destabilized or overthrown.
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Government effectiveness. This variable combines aspects of the quality of
public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil
servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the
credibility of the government’s commitment to policies.
Regulatory quality. This aspect of governance is more focused on the policies
themselves. It includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies
such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision as well as perceptions of
the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and
business development.
Rule of law. Included in this dimension of governance are several indicators
that measure the extent to which the citizens of a country have confidence
in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of the
incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the
enforceability of contracts.
Control of corruption. This dimension of governance measures perceptions of
corruption. By this measure corruption is defined as the exercise of public
power for private gain. It is often a manifestation of a lack of respect of both
the corrupter and the corrupted for the rules that govern their interactions,
and hence represents a failure of governance.
A simple comparison (table 4) of MENA and non-MENA countries suggests
the MENA region lags considerably behind other parts of the world in most
areas of liberalization. The gap is particularly large in most areas of
governance (in table 2 larger values indicate better governance) especially the
critical one of voice and accountability. Regulatory quality is another area
where the MENA countries significantly lag behind other parts of the world.
On the other hand the MENA countries compare fairly favorably to non-
MENA countries in several areas of economic freedom (in table 4 large values
indicate lower levels of economic freedom)—monetary policy, fiscal burden
and the size of the informal (black) market. Still, the region’s trade policies,
government intervention, foreign investment, and flexibility in wages and
prices lag considerably behind other parts of the world.
To determine if these reform measures were sufficient to separate in
some statistical sense the MENA from the non-MENA developing countries,
a discriminant analysis was performed.9 Of the 22 MENA countries that
comparable data was available, 19 were correctly paced in the MENA group
(table 5). Fifteen of the MENA countries had a probability of over 90% as
fitting the MENA reform profile. Based on their values of reform attainment,
only three countries, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen were classified as likely to be
non-MENA developing countries.
The reform variables statistically significant in separating the MENA
from non-MENA economies were, in order of importance: (1) government





















































































Non-MENA countries (139) 0.08598 0.08841 0.05773 0.12319 0.06515 0.04490
MENA countries (23) 0.97011 0.52158 0.34716 0.52671 0.16044 0.29197
Difference 1.05609 0.60999 0.40489 0.6499 0.22559 0.33687
Average Values 2000–2
Non-MENA countries (139) 0.08478 0.04330 0.06737 0.12383 0.04320 0.03408
MENA countries (23) 0.97876 0.41770 0.29978 0.50374 0.22263 0.24922












Non-MENA Countries (136) 3.54277 3.38744 2.67261 3.37610 2.72022
MENA Countries (22) 4.14545 3.67159 3.63788 3.01136 3.32955
Difference 0.60268 0.28415 0.96527 0.36474 0.60933
Average values 2000–2
Non-MENA Countries (137) 3.32092 3.45668 2.62786 2.49878 2.75474
MENA Countries (22) 4.04545 3.49273 3.52273 2.14545 3.29091










Non-MENA Countries (140) 2.97500 2.82488 2.76544 3.34718 3.44265


































































































Difference 0.53409 0.45012 0.30047 0.08582 0.01190
Average values 2000–2
Non-MENA Countries (139) 2.88759 2.69015 2.94526 3.43443 3.42007
MENA Countries (20) 3.54545 3.14545 3.47273 3.61515 3.56364
Difference 0.65786 0.45530 0.52747 0.18072 0.14357
Compiled from: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996–2002 (Washington, DC: World Bank,
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and (5) property rights. All of these variables are likely to affect or be
reflections of actions likely to impact on the globalization process.
The sections below examine the factors underlying the weak integration of
the MENA countries into the global economy. In particular have economic
reforms been insufficient to take advantage of the opportunities opened up
by the factors noted above? Or has the lag in governance and institutional
development been primarily responsible?
Globalization and Reforms
Despite its limitations, the KFP globalization index is still the best
tool available for identifying many key relationships of interest to policy
makers. If their objective is to increase their integration into the world
economy, should the Middle Eastern countries focus on economic reforms






Very High Probability of MENA Group
Algeria 1.93978 0.06028 0.93972
Bahrein 3.30283 0.00232 0.99768
Egypt 1.85825 0.07255 0.92745
Iraq 1.91416 0.06391 0.93609
Jordan 2.38860 0.02106 0.97894
Kuwait 2.08439 0.04317 0.95683
Libya 2.44436 0.01844 0.98156
Morocco 1.96336 0.05711 0.94289
Oman 3.85419 0.00061 0.99939
Qatar 4.03015 0.00040 0.99960
Saudi Arabia 4.06767 0.00036 0.99964
Syria 2.76377 0.00856 0.99144
Tunisia 2.65033 0.01125 0.98875
UAE 2.90754 0.00605 0.99395
High Probability of MENA Group
Iran 1.65104 0.11468 0.88532
Pakistan 1.80163 0.08239 0.91761
Moderate Probability of MENA Group
Djibouti 1.17052 0.29435 0.70565
Lebanon 0.81807 0.49587 0.50413
Mauritania 1.04407 0.36203 0.63797
Miss-Classified
Somalia 0.63109 0.60792 0.39208
Sudan 0.23931 0.92804 0.07196
Yemen 0.42607 0.95309 0.04691
Source: Compiled by author.
Notes: Discriminating variables in order of importance: (1) government intervention, (2) voice/
accountability, (3) rule of law, (4) foreign investment, and (5) property rights.
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or improved governance? Or, are both types of reforms of relatively equal
importance? Are some reforms more effective in the economic area while
others best for improving the technological aspect of globalization?
The Kearney/Foreign Policy (KFP) Summary Measure of Globalization
Splitting the KFP over-all ranking of countries into two groups—the top 31
countries or highly globalized economies and the bottom 31 countries or, lesser
globalized countries produces several patterns. First significant differences in
governance exist between the two groups of countries (table 6). On all of the
major dimensions of governance, the top group has made significantly more
progress in most areas of reform. The greatest gap between the two groups
appears to be in the control of corruption followed by the rule of law and
government effectiveness.
While the high globalizers also outperform the low globalizers in most of the
economic areas (high values in the economic areas indicate a lower level of
attainment), the differences between the two do not appear nearly as large as in
the governance measures. In fact, as was the case with the MENA and non-
MENA groupings, the low globalizers have lower fiscal burdens than their high
globalizer counterparts. In the economic area the high globalizers have the
biggest lead in eliminating the informal (black) markets, developing sound
banking and finance sectors and in implementing good trade policy (openness).
To gain a rough idea of the reform/globalization linkages for the MENA
countries another discriminant analyis was carried out. Based on their KFP
overall Globalization rank, countries were split into two groups—a high degree
of globalization group with ranks from 1 to 31, and a low globalization group
with ranks from 32 to 62. Using the governance and economic freedom
variables to classify the high and low globalized nations, 91.9% of the 62 KFP
countries were correctly classified (table 7). All of the MENA countries,
together with Israel and Turkey were correctly classified. As anticipated from
the previous examination of reform variable means, the classification of high
and low globalized countries was dominated by governance variables.
In order of statistical importance the statistically significant, classifying
variables were: (1) rule of law, (2) voice and accountability, (3) property rights
and (4) regulatory quality. A similar result was obtained using the composite
Factor Score ranking of globalization developed above (table 3).
As noted, one of the criticisms of the KFP index involves the often sharp
change in ranking of countries from one year to the next. To test whether this
might affect our results a similar discriminate excersise was performed on the
KFP index for 2005 (actual country values for the year 2003). Again, all the
MENA countries, together with Israel and Turkey were classified correctly
with a high degree of probability (table 8). As before several governance
variables, rule of law and voice/accountability differentiated the high from low
globalized countries characterized the high.
These results suggest that given the KFP globalization rankings and country
reform efforts in the governance and economic freedom areas, it should be




















































































Globalization ranking – bottom group (31 countries)
Mean 0.22898 0.35825 0.08878 0.03460 0.20147 0.29696
Globalization ranking – top group (31 countries)
Mean 1.14075 1.02967 1.35348 1.22553 1.36119 1.41018











Globalization ranking – bottom group (31 countries)
Mean 3.67 3.34 2.76 2.62 2.85
Globalization ranking – top group (31 countries)
Mean 2.23 4.00 2.51 1.56 2.12









Globalization ranking – bottom group (31 countries)
Mean 3.22 2.61 3.19 3.54 3.60
Globalization ranking – top group (31 countries)
Mean 2.08 2.24 1.73 2.65 1.94
Difference 1.14 0.37 1.46 0.89 1.66
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made in a country’s liberalization efforts. Put differently, which reforms or
interaction of reforms drive globalization in general and in the MENA region
in particular?11
The results of this assessment produced some interesting findings (figure 2).
First, governance measures dominated the country grouping structure best
describing the KFP overall globalization ranking. Specifically, based on
progress made in improving the rule of law, countries can be grouped12 into
three distinct categories: (1) a low rule of law grouping of 31 countries with a
mean globalization score of 45.8, (2) a medium attainment rule of law grouping
of 19 countries with a mean globalization score 22.6, and (3) a final group of
12 countries at the high-end of the rule of law scale. This group’s mean ranking
on the KFP globalization scale was 8.5.
Second, for the bottom two clusters of countries, an additional statistically
significant split exists. This split is controlled by progress made in an average
of the six measures of governance. For the 31 low rule of law countries, this
split produces two more distinct sets of countries—25 countries with low overall








Using Kearney Overall Rank
Morocco 0.07366 0.59651 0.40349
Tunisia 0.86952 0.94749 0.05251
Egypt 1.94019 0.99809 0.00191
Pakistan 2.72574 0.99984 0.00016
Saudi Arabia 1.49085 0.99220 0.00780
Iran 1.62718 0.99491 0.00509
Israel 0.82267 0.08116 0.91884
Turkey 2.04616 0.99863 0.00137
Initial grouping: High Globalization Group Kearney rank 1–31,
Low Globalization Group, Kearney rank 32–62.
Discriminating variables (1) rule of law, (2) voice and accountability,
(3) property rights and (4) regulatory quality.
Probability of correct placement 91.9%
Using Factor 1 Score Ranking
Morocco 0.60916 0.82544 0.17456
Tunisia 0.34861 0.69782 0.30218
Egypt 0.71304 0.86288 0.13712
Pakistan 2.10220 0.99653 0.00347
Saudi Arabia 0.07323 0.51984 0.48016
Iran 1.84455 0.99298 0.00702
Israel 0.75541 0.09974 0.90026
Turkey 0.92794 0.91913 0.08087
Initial grouping: High Globalization Group, Factor 1 Score equal or
greater than 0, Low Globalization Group, factor 1 Score less than 0.
Discriminating variables: (1) rule of law.
Probability of correct placement 91.9%
Source: Compiled by author.
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governance and six countries with a moderate level of governance. The first
group contains six Middle East (and Pakistan) countries, Morocco, Egypt,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran. These countries clearly are at the lower end of
the governance scale with their globalization prospects held back by the lack of
progress in this area. Tunisia’s governance efforts have paid off somewhat
placing that country in the next set of countries. Finally, Israel with the highest
level of governance and globalization in the region is classified along with 12
other countries in the medium rule of law, good overall governance grouping.
This group has a mean globalization score of 26.8.
As noted earlier, causation is always an issue in discussions of globalization.
In this case is it possible to argue that improved levels of globalization
(however attained) placed pressure on governments to improve their rule of law
in order to remain competitive in the world economy? Or is the relationship
from mainly from one of improved rule of law facilitating a higher level of
globalization?








Using Kearney Overall Rank
Morocco 0.51437 0.82937 0.17063
Tunisia 1.07823 0.95983 0.04017
Egypt 1.52668 0.98834 0.01166
Pakistan 2.63047 0.99948 0.00052
Saudi Arabia 1.31911 0.97924 0.02076
Iran 1.16503 0.96828 0.03172
Israel 0.72710 0.12734 0.87266
Turkey 1.79501 0.99450 0.00550
Initial grouping: High Globalization Group Kearney rank 1–31,
Low Globalization Group, Kearney rank 32–62.
Discriminating variables (1) rule of law, (2) voice and accountability,
and (3) property rights.
Probability of correct placement 87.1%
Using Factor 1 Score Ranking
Morocco 0.59353 0.85785 0.14215
Tunisia 0.33966 0.75499 0.24501
Egypt 0.69475 0.88750 0.11250
Pakistan 2.04826 0.99649 0.00351
Saudi Arabia 0.07135 0.60229 0.39771
Iran 1.79722 0.99320 0.00680
Israel 0.73603 0.15154 0.84846
Turkey 0.90413 0.93213 0.06787
Initial grouping: High Globalization Group, Factor 1 Score equal
or greater than 0, Low Globalization Group, factor 1 Score less than 0.
Discriminating variables: (1) rule of law.
Probability of correct placement 91.9%
Source: Compiled by author.
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To test the manner in which globalization and the rule of law impact each
other a similar classification tree exercise was performed with the rule of law
assumed to be determined by globalization. The other five governance
measures and the 10 economic freedom measures were included as possible
determinants of the rule of law. The results (figure 3) suggest that
improvements in the rule of law are largely controlled by corruption and not
globalization. As control of corruption improves, there tends to be is a
corresponding gain in the rule of law—globalization does not appear to place
an independent set of pressures on countries to revamp their legal systems.
From this, we can tentatively conclude that improved governance, in this case
through the rule of law, provides support for increased degrees of
globalization.
The General Globalization Index
To see if the general globalization index derived (table 3) from the Kearney/
Foreign policy rankings paints an analogous picture, a similar classification
analysis was performed on the index presented in table 4. The results (figure 4)
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Figure 2. Factors affecting the Kearney/foreign policy globalization ranking
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A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy index. Again, governance reforms dominate the
structure of relationships, with corruption entering directly (rather than
through the rule of law as with the Kearney/Foreign Policy index) to partition
the globalization index into three groups of countries.
As expected, a country’s globalization ranking improves with improved
control over corruption. Countries with high levels of corruption can offset this
impediment somewhat through improving their regulatory quality as in the
case of Turkey. Clearly though, a more efficient strategy is to face corruption
directly as in the case of Israel, Morocco, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia. Finally
causation likely runs directly from corruption to globalization (higher negative
means in figure 4 represent higher ranks on the general globalization index).
The results from the analysis of the general globalization index suggest that
the KFP rankings in the sub categories of technology, economic globalization,
personal globalization, and political globalization are likely to be robust
enough to warrant further analysis.
The KFP Globalization Sub-Components
In the case of technological globalization (figure 5), economic variables enter









































Figure 4. Factors affecting the general globalization index
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globalization depending on the extent to which they formulate an open trade
policy. Specifically, the 24 countries with a very open trade policy have a mean
technological globalization ranking of 13.5, whereas the bottom 12 countries
in terms of trade openness have a mean ranking of 51.75 (with 62 the
lowest rank).
Those countries at the top of the trade policy scale have improved their
technological globalization ranking even further through the establishment of
a high quality regulatory environment. Of the Middle Eastern countries in
our sample, only Israel appears in a position to increase through improved
regulation of its regulatory environment. Turkey on the other hand falls in an
intermediate trade-openness group. The country’s low mean score on the
technological globalization index is due to its trade policies, but within that
context, could be improved somewhat through improved political stability.
Unfortunately most of our sample MENA countries fall in the bottom
category because of their relatively closed economies.13 If these countries want
to get linked in with the flow of world-wide technological information, they
must place concerted efforts into opening their economies through improved
trade policy. As noted above, given the fact that several of these countries are
not even members of the World Trade Organization, it may take some years
before significant progress is made in the technological area.
The KFP Economic Globalization rankings are controlled by political
stability with three main clusters of countries partitioning the rankings
(figure 6). A further split of the least globalized group (mean ranking of 45.2
out of 62) can be made on the basis of the extent of the black market or
informal economy. Those countries with large informal economies (Pakistan
and Iran) have globalization rankings considerably below those countries
(Israel, Morocco, Egypt and Turkey) where the black market is not as
prevalent. Again governance measures dominate the country grouping process.
Still, this result is somewhat surprising in the sense that only one of the
economic freedom variables (tangentially at that) helps tp explain the relative
ranking of countries along the economic dimension.
Government effectiveness is the most significant factor clustering countries
along the personal globalization dimension (figure 7). In contrast to several of
the previous globalization dimensions, the Middle Eastern countries are fairly
spread out along the personal globalization scale, with Turkey, Pakistan and
Iran in the bottom group of countries, while Israel and Tunisia are in a group
of 19 countries just below the top group.
Finally, the main split in the political globalization scale of countries is
formed by the voice-accountability measure of governance (figure 8). Two
groups of countries are present, a fairly large group of 37 countries with
relatively high deficiencies in voice and accountability and a higher group of 15
countries with a mean political globalization ranking of 16. All of the Middle
Eastern countries fall in the low group. While countries in the high group
appear to have the option of increasing their globalization along this dimension
through improved trade openness, the Middle Eastern countries will have to
place most of their efforts into improved voice governance before this option
becomes available.
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Figure 6. Factors affecting the Kearney economic globalization index







































Figure 7. Factors affecting the Kearney personal globalization index
Middle East Globalization 199
*** [5.11.2005–7:55pm] [173–202] [Page No. 200] {TandF}Rmee/RMEE_A_140687.3d
First Proof Review of Middle East Economics and Finance (RMEE)
Conclusions
As noted in the widely discussed Arab Human Development Report (United
Nations, 2002) the MENA region performs poorly in the areas of civil and
political freedoms, gender equality, and more generally opportunities for the
full development of human capabilities and knowledge. To overcome the
handicaps, modern institutions such as freely elected legislature and competent
and independent judiciaries and institutions that safeguard civil and human
rights need to be strengthened.
As many studies have shown, economic growth and good governance are
interconnected. In most regions, as incomes grow so then does public
governance. However, in the MENA region, the quality of public account-
ability did not follow this pattern (World Bank, 2004). As noted above, the
region lags considerably behind other parts of the world in all of the major
dimensions of governance.
Productivity, economic growth and good governance are related and given
the lack of improvements in governance, the MENA economies have suffered
(World Bank, 2004). Productivity in the MENA region has been on a decline
for 30 years and average annual per capita growth has grown at only 0.9%
over the last 20 years. Clearly, excessive bureaucratic systems and lengthy
regulatory environments inhibit growth.
The analysis above suggests increased levels of globalization are a related



































Figure 8. Factors affecting the Kearney political globalization index
(Source: Compiled by author)
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Middle East countries wishing to improve their integration into the world
economy, improvements in the various areas of governance have the greatest
pay-offs at the present time. While economic reforms have been carried out
in many of the MENA countries, our analysis suggests further continuation
in this area, while desirable from a number of perspectives, would seem to hold
out little prospect for significantly improving the integration of these countries
into the global economy.
The task of making significant improvement in governance is enormous,
however, facing considerable resistance throughout the region. In part, some of
this resistance may stem from the fact that there is a sizeable imbalance in the
way the region has preceded with liberalization. Much more progress in recent
years has been made in the economic freedom area relative to the various
dimensions of governance. No doubt this has resulted in many of the key
countries being exposed to some of the competitive rigors of international
competition, while at the same time not possessing the domestic institutions
capable of enabling the countries to take advantage of opportunities opened up
by increased integration into the world economy. This has resulted in a
negative perception of globalization throughout most of the region, making
progress in the governance area all that more difficult.
Notes
1. Cf. Sachs (2000) for an elaboration on globalization’s impact on growth.
2. As developed in A.T. Kearney (2002).
3. A full critique of the index is given in Lockwood (2004).
4. For an extensive discussion on factor analysis see Rummel (1970).
5. See for example Lopez-Carlos (2005).
6. See for example Miles et al. (2004).
7. Available from: Global Economic Software, Ltd, www.globaleconomicsoftware.com.
Cf. Looney (2003) for an application of this data set to the Middle East.
8. The MENA countries included are Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and
Iran. In addition two regional countries Israel and Turkey not normally grouped as MENA
nations were included.
9. For a description of this technique and interpretation of results see SPSS Base 10.0 (SPSS,
1999).
10. For this purpose a classification tree was developed. See SPSS (2001) for a description of
the program and logic underlying classification trees.
11. The predictive variables were the six governance measures and ten economic freedom
indices) listed in table 5, as well as an overall average of the governance variables and
the economic freedom measures. The reforms are averaged over the 2000–2002 period
and the Kearney globalization rankings are for the year 2002 (the latest year available).
12. A good discussion of how groups are formed is given in Breiman et al. (1984).
13. One has to assume most of the MENA countries not included in the KFP index are likely
to be even less integrated into the world economy.
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